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1 Introduction
Net Present Value is a deceptively simple prescription
that has dominated academic advice. Discount all ex-
pected cash flows at a risk adjusted discount rate and
if the result is positive, invest, otherwise do not invest.
It is still possible to read the following in textbooks:
“NPV considers all of the costs and benefits of each
investment opportunity” and “we have seen that NPV
is a totally logical way of assessing investment oppor-
tunities” and even that it is the academically preferred
method. Nowadays, few academics and, we suspect,
no practitioners support this view.
In this article we present a schema that summarizes
the more recent theoretical developments. Their ef-
fect is to change the whole approach to investment
analysis from just trying to predict expected cash
flows to a far more business like analysis of the invest-
ment problem. Such is the extent of the change when
going beyond NPV that it is something of a puzzle that
many accounts still maintain that NPV is a complete
answer.
Of course, businessmen have known that there
were problems with NPV all along; surveys over the
years reveal that they simply included NPV in a list
of valuation techniques that continually expanded.
This is not really surprising as NPV limits investment
to just the initial investment decision and assumes
no specific reaction to the investment. In the real
world, businessmen think of decisions that depend
on the outcome of the investment (the so-called real
options); they also think of the reactions of competi-
tors and other significant parties such as government
and regulators.
2 Howwe got hooked on NPV
The net present value equation has been known at
least from the 1600s and was used for borrowing and
lending calculations such as bond valuation. It was
never considered as a method of valuing projects until
the 20th Century. Even then, an early text in the 1950s
advocated NPV as a tool of practical importance only
when there are distinctive cash flows.
The major advance for NPV came with the develop-
ment of financial economics in the late 50s and 60s.
One of its main aims was to explain asset pricing in
markets. Shares in the stock market were the most
transparent example; but valuing all assets in all mar-
kets, including seeing investment projects as assets
was the scope. The misapplication of NPV to projects
arose because at the market level, the more detailed
aspects of investment cancel out and the NPV model
serves as a reasonable approximation of share price
behaviour.
Analysis appropriate at the highly aggregated level
of the share came to be seen as appropriate for the
disaggregated level of the individual investment. Of-
ten this is not the case, psychology differs from so-
ciology; quantum theory explains the small, general
relativity the large. The market view differs from the
project view.
Such was the elegance of a theory that went from
shareholder risk preferences to valuing individual
projects that the academic world was very reluctant
to let go of the NPV model and began to view prac-
tice as in some way deficient. NPV was the “way the
world should work” and evidence to the contrary was
dismissed and labeled the “gap between theory and
practice”.
3 Then came the doubts
Ironically, doubt came not from practice but from the-
ory itself. In the late 1970s Stuart Myers suggested
that the latest developments in option pricing could
be applied to real investments rather than just shares.
He coined the term real options. The analysis re-
vealed large flaws in the NPV model. NPV failed to in-
1
clude the possibility of delay. Worse than that, it failed
to include any future decision that depended on the
outcome of the project – post investment decisions.
Yet undeniably, delay and decisions down the line are
part of many if not most large investments.
At the turn of this century, academics, notably
Stephen Grenadier in Chicago, pointed out that as
well as post investment decisions, competition was
very poorly represented being no more than back-
ground noise – unresponsive to the particular invest-
ment. To include competitor responses he turned to
a huge area of the economic literature termed game
theory. Perhaps this title is unfortunate, competition
theory might have been more appropriate. However,
the gravitas of game theory should not be underes-
timated, with 5 Nobel laureates, it rivals those of fi-
nance.
Game theorists call NPV and options “games
against nature”. Also relevant are games against com-
petitors - chess rather than golf, playing the man
rather than the ball.
The famous prisoner’s dilemma illustrates the kind
of issues. Suppose your firm and a competitor can in-
vest in a new development, but profits will be lower
than if you both do not invest. So do not invest? The
worst outcome is if your competitor invests and you
do not. So you invest to avoid the worst outcome –
even if the NPV is negative. This is just one of a num-
ber of “games” or competitive scenarios where the so-
lution is a strategy that is more complex than the sim-
ple NPV model.
4 Piecing it all together
Businessmen do not have the luxury of being selective
about the world they face. Academics forget this. In-
deed, we are not aware of any major textbook that ad-
dresses all the developments we have outlined – these
we summarize Figure 1.
Although NPV appears in all the Figure 1 boxes, its
importance varies greatly. In low competition envi-
ronments the main considerations are NPV and de-
cisions that depend on the outcome - real options.
As competition increases, so game theory consider-
ations become critical. Here, the differences in value
between strategies are such that the niceties of NPV
are not relevant.
Figure 1: A decision model classification
5 The way ahead
So what can a businessman take from this? Certainly
the dominance of NPV is no longer. Investment is now
seen as part of a sequence of decisions that depend on
outcomes and reactions.
Some examples will help. Firstly, an investment by
a train company to increase capacity may not have a
positive net present value. It might seem that it is a
monopoly supplier, yet, there can be a reaction from
the air industry. Failure to invest may mean losing out
and losing opportunities created by greater capacity.
The isolated consideration of NPV is not sufficient.
A second example is when an organisation devel-
ops new products and markets or both at the same
time. Apple’s creation of the IPad is one such instance.
Before its launch, there was no product or market
in existence. Undertaking net present value analysis
would be difficult based on an evidential approach.
However, when seen as part of a dynamic game with
other high-tec companies, the value of innovating, or
indeed, the cost of not innovating is much clearer.
The differences are so great that detailed NPV calcu-
lations are irrelevant.
Applying the wider set of academic valuation mod-
els outlined here will hopefully lend clarity to prac-
tice and close any gaps between the two. What we
can say for now is that there is no argument to sup-
port the view that NPV is completely logical or that
it is academically preferred. The new models are
more demanding and more difficult to implement,
but are much closer to a world that businessmen
would recognise.
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